Vaccination involves a tradeoff between two risky alternatives, namely, susceptibility and immunization. By designing a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the association between risk preferences and immunization decisions. To contrast the role of risk preferences in vaccination decisions with other domains, we implemented four frames: vaccination, surgery, complex neutral, and simple neutral. We found direct framing effects for females but not for males. For the former, the demand for the safer alternative is significantly larger in the surgery frame than in all other frames. For male subjects, we found a significant association between stated risk preferences and choice behavior in the simple neutral frame but not in the other three frames. For female subjects, we observed the exact opposite. Although the complexity of the decision problem matters, there is no indication of differential roles of risk preferences for a given complexity. We found that the share of consistent choices is significantly larger in the surgery frame as compared to the two neutral frames, that is, context improves decision making. This does not apply to the vaccination frame, so there is something about vaccinations that prevents individuals from better understanding the decision problem at hand.
INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization (WHO) considers vaccinations as "one of the most successful and cost-effective health interventions known" (World Health Organization [WHO] , 2013, p. 5) and estimates that vaccines safe around 2.5 million lives per year (p. 12). Despite the effectiveness and efficiency of vaccinations, immunization rates are well below targets in a great many of countries. While impaired access to fundamental health care is perhaps the most important factor in explaining insufficient immunization rates in developing countries, poor access to essential immunization cannot explain the low demand for vaccinations in (parts of) the developed world. 1 Germany serves as an example. Although health insurance is mandatory and health plans generally cover essential immunization, vaccination rates tend to be below targets. As compared to the WHO target of influenza vaccination rates of at least 75% in the age group 60 years and above (WHO, 2003) , for instance, the 35% vaccination rate in the flu season 2015/2016 is considerably smaller (Robert Koch Institut [RKI] , 2017a). For measles, only about 86% of the 2012 birth cohort received the recommended two vaccinations before the age of 3 years, well below the 95% target (RKI, 2017b) .
Beyond access perhaps the most important economic explanation for insufficient immunization rates is the positive vaccination externality. In the tradeoff between immunity and susceptibility, individuals do not take (full) account of the social benefit of vaccination, namely, that vaccination contributes to herd immunity or, in other words, that vaccinated individuals cannot (or are less likely to) infect others. As vaccination lowers the infection probability for those unprotected, susceptible individuals free-ride on the preventive actions of those who demand immunization. Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991) were the first to emphasize this fundamental problem. They argue, however, that due to side effects, the socially optimal vaccination rate is below 100%. Geoffard and Philipson (1997) address the difficulty of eradicating vaccine preventable diseases, the main problem being the prevalence elasticity of demand. Public health policies such as subsidies or mandatory vaccination programs increase immunization rates of those covered by the program and thereby reduce the infection probability of those outside the program and with it the immunization rates of the latter. This peculiarity poses a challenge to health policy makers. Mullahy (1999) argued that an improvement in immunization policies requires a better understanding of individual vaccination decisions.
Accordingly, the more recent economics literature on vaccinations highlights the role of individual preferences on immunization decisions. The first question is whether more altruistic individuals internalize a larger share of the social benefit of vaccination and are, thus, more likely to demand immunization than less altruistic individuals. Using an interactive laboratory experiment, Böhm, Betsch, and Korn (2016) found evidence for "pro-social" behavior, which may well be rooted in altruism. Taking the flu shot as an example, altruism has no explanatory power in the observational study of Nuscheler and Roeder (2016) .
To identify the most important preference dimensions beyond altruism, it is key to understand vaccination as an investment decision. While the expected costs of vaccination materialize almost immediately, the expected benefits accrue in some future period(s), that is, time preferences will certainly matter. More future-oriented individuals are expected to have a higher inclination to demand immunization than more present-oriented individuals (see Bradford, 2010 for empirical evidence). As the future is inherently uncertain, risk preferences are likely to affect vaccination behavior as well. From a theoretical perspective, the directional effect of risk aversion on the demand for immunization is ambiguous as both the costs and the benefits of vaccination are risky. The empirical literature on the relationship between risk aversion and vaccination is slim. Tsutsui, Benzion, Shahrabani, and Din (2010) and Tsutsui, Benzion, and Shahrabani (2012) find a positive relationship between risk aversion and the demand for flu shots in the United States and Japan, respectively. For German data, Nuscheler and Roeder (2016) confirm this finding for females but not for males where risk preferences play no role. The most important problem of these observational studies is that risk is not under the control of the researchers. Individual decisions are, thus, based on subjective probabilities that are likely to depart from the objective ones. 2 We addressed this shortcoming by designing a controlled laboratory real effort experiment. To keep risk under control, we considered an exogenous infection probability, that is, the risk of infection does not vary with the decisions of other experimental subjects. The vaccine is imperfect in two ways. First, with some positive probability, the vaccine is not effective and second, there is a positive probability of side effects. We parameterized the problem such that vaccination is less risky than susceptibility so that standard economic theory predicts a positive association between risk aversion and the demand for immunization. To actually test this hypothesis, we elicited general risk preferences using a 10-point Likert scale. 3 Our research interest, however, goes beyond this simple correlation. The question is whether or not there is anything special about immunization decisions. To check whether risk preferences affect the tradeoff between two risky alternatives differently in the health domain than in the financial domain, we implemented two neutral frames and two health frames. 4 Dohmen et al. (2011) demonstrated that risk preferences differ across domains so that the predictive power of general risk preferences on choice behavior depends on the domain under consideration. This implies an identification challenge as any difference across frames in the correlation between general risk preferences and choice behavior may be due to different risk preferences across domains or be the result of general risk preferences translating differently into choice behavior across domains. To solve this identification problem, we complemented the vaccination frame with a second, structurally identical, health frame and we opted for a surgery frame.
We implemented the four frames using a between subject design. There were 15 rounds per session. In each round, subjects were asked whether or not they are willing to vaccinate or, more generally, whether they prefer the safer alternative over the riskier one. While the expected gross benefit of vaccination remained unchanged throughout the experiment, the costs of vaccination varied between three levels, low, medium, and high (within subject design). The costs changed after five rounds (between subject design to account for order effects). In the alternative health frame, we considered surgery the safer alternative and allowed for a positive probability of complications (i.e., side effects). For the purposes of identification, we implemented two neutral frames where subjects had to choose between two abstract lotteries that were identical to the ones resulting from the two health frames. While we implemented a compound lottery in the complex neutral frame, we used the respective reduced lottery in the simple neutral frame.
We find that risk preferences are significantly associated with choice behavior in the laboratory. Independent of the frame, more risk averse individuals are more likely to choose the safer alternative. Using pooled data, our regression analysis reveals no quantitative difference in the association between risk preferences and choice behavior across the two health frames, that is, there seems to be nothing special about vaccinations. A gender stratified analysis offers additional insights. For male subjects, we find that risk preferences matter in the simple neutral frame but not in the other three. For female subjects, risk preferences play no role in the simple neutral frame but in the other three frames. The complexity of the decision problem, thus, seems to matter. Notably, if there is anything special about health, it is not vaccination but surgery. It is significantly more likely that female subjects choose the safer alternative in the surgery frame than in the other three frames. Also, the impact of risk preferences is significantly stronger in the surgery frame than in the two neutral frames. There is no significant difference between the two health frames, though. Interestingly, we find that choice behavior in the vaccination frame tends to be less consistent than in the surgery frame. These results show that framing matters in a nontrivial way. Chapman et al. (2012) were the first to analyze individual vaccination decisions using a controlled laboratory experiment. They emphasize the importance of the free-riding problem but neglect the role of risk aversion. Similarly, the more recent papers by Ibuka, Li, Vietri, Chapman, and Galvani (2014) , Böhm et al. (2016) , and Böhm, Meier, Korn, and Betsch (2017) investigate several aspects of immunization decisions in the light of the social dilemma implied by the positive vaccination externality. In all experiments, the infection probability is endogenously determined by the vaccination decisions of subjects so that risk is not under the control of the researchers. While this is unproblematic for the research questions, these authors are investigating the most fundamental factor in decision making under risk, namely, risk preferences, cannot be addressed. Our paper fills this gap in the experimental literature on immunization decisions. We also contribute to the literature on domain specific risk preferences in the sense that the impact of our general risk measure is investigated in different frames (see, e.g., Barseghyan, Prince, & Teitelbaum, 2011; Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu, & Cullen, 2012; and Slovic, 1972) . Furthermore, we provide additional evidence on the importance of risk preferences in the health realm (see, e.g., Anderson & Mellor, 2008 and Lahiri & Song, 2000) and, more generally, on gender specific risk attitudes (see Croson & Gneezy, 2009 and Eckel & Grossman, 2008 for surveys) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is laid out in Section 2 followed by a descriptive analysis in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the results of our econometric analysis and, finally, offer concluding remarks in Section 5.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Laboratory, participants, and software
In order to investigate the role of risk preferences in vaccination decisions, we conducted a real effort experiment in the Laboratory for Economic Experiments on Human Behavior (LEcH) at the University of Augsburg (November and December 2015 and June 2017). 5 We recruited 329 participants for 34 sessions using the online registration tool hroot (for more information, see Bock, Baetge, & Nicklisch, 2014) . All participants were students from various faculties of the University of Augsburg. The experiment had 15 rounds and was complemented by a questionnaire at the end of the experiment (see Section 2.4 for details); average session duration was 62 min. The experiment was computerized, and we used z-Tree to implement it (Fischbacher, 2007) . The econometric analysis was performed with STATA 14.
Frames
The literature suggests that risk preferences depend on the domain and that, accordingly, the predictive power of general risk preferences for individual decisions differs across domains (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011) . To shed light on this, we considered four frames: vaccination (9 sessions/88 participants), surgery (8/80), simple neutral (8/80), and complex neutral (9/81). All four frames are payoff-equivalent. The framing was implemented by a between subject design. We first ran the simple neutral sessions, then the surgery sessions, followed by the vaccination sessions (November and December 2015). As a response to reviewers, we implemented a complex neutral frame (June 2017). Although it is not uncommon to contrast a specific health frame with a neutral setting, the direct comparison of two health frames is innovative. This allows us not only to assess the potentially different role of risk preferences between neutral settings and health environments but also to investigate whether or not there is anything special about vaccinations in the health realm. This is of particular importance as the public debate on vaccinations is strongly affected by ideological positions and "alternative facts," which in turn, might affect individual immunization decisions.
Vaccination frame
At the beginning of each of the 15 rounds, subjects received a time endowment of 140 s for the respective round. Depending on their decision, experimental parameters, and the state of nature in a round, participants may lose some of their endowment. At the end of each round, participants were asked to perform a real effort task in the time that was left remaining (see Section 2.3 below).
There is a 40% chance of being exposed to some virus. Conditional on exposure, the probability of infection for unprotected individuals is 100%, that is, the unconditional infection probability of unvaccinated individuals is 40%. As we want to investigate the role of risk preferences on vaccination decisions in isolation, we let the infection probability be exogenous. 6 In case of an infection, the individual loses 100 s of the endowment and is, thus, left with 40 s for the real effort task. With the remaining 60% probability, the individual is not exposed to the virus. In this case, the individual remains healthy and keeps the entire 140 s for the task.
The alternative to being completely unprotected is to demand vaccination. The available vaccine, however, is imperfect. The first imperfection is its limited efficacy. If the individual is exposed to the virus, then the vaccine offers protection in 50% of the cases. In other words, even vaccinated individuals may contract the disease. The probability of this event occurring is 20% (=0.4*0.5). As compared to unvaccinated individuals, the course of the disease is milder for vaccinated individuals so that the associated loss only amounts to 25 s rather than 100 s. The second imperfection are side effects. Conditional on vaccination, side effects occur with 20% probability and imply a loss of 25 s for the real effort task. 7 Finally, there are positive costs of vaccination of 10, 30, or 50 s. 8 All random events are stochastically independent. To assist subjects, we provided them with detailed instructions including Table 1. In the Appendix, we provide the game tree of the vaccination frame (see Figure A .1). 9
Surgery frame
The structure of the surgery frame is identical to the vaccination frame. The challenge was to come up with a surgery that is sufficiently similar to vaccination. Most importantly, the surgery must be elective, preventive, and minor. We argue that a tonsillectomy is such a procedure. An individual may be exposed to some bacteria (probability = 40%) that cause a tonsillitis (loss = 100 s). When not exposed (60%), the individual remains healthy. A tonsillectomy reduces the probability of infection to 50% when exposed. The individual may still get sick but can no longer suffer from a tonsillitis but a throat infection (loss = 25 s). Like vaccination, a surgery is risky. The probability of complications is 20% and the associated loss amounts to 25 s. Finally, surgery is costly, and the costs vary between the same levels as in the vaccination frame. Subjects received detailed instructions including a table such as Table 1 . 10 Note that the similarity between a tonsillectomy and 
Neutral frames
We implemented two neutral frames, a simple one and a complex one. In the simple neutral frame, we asked individuals to choose between two abstract lotteries, where the riskier lottery is identical to the lotteries that unprotected subjects play in the vaccination frame and the surgery frame, respectively. The less risky lottery is slightly different, though. To ease presentation, we showed subjects the reduced lottery, that is, we added up the probabilities for outcomes with identical remaining seconds. 11 One may well argue that this simplification is problematic as two things change at the same time, frame and complexity, undermining the identification of framing effects. This is particularly so as our payment protocol adds another layer of uncertainty (only one of the 15 rounds is randomly selected and paid out). Harrison, Martinez-Correa, and Swarthout (2015) showed that under this rather common payment procedure, behavior changes when moving from a compound lottery to the corresponding reduced lottery. To address this problem, we implemented a complex neutral frame where individuals have to play three abstract lotteries that are identical to the ones played in the health frames. 12 At first sight, the complex neutral frame appears more appropriate than the simple neutral frame as it suggests that a comparison of individual behavior across frames is a ceteris paribus exercise. This is not necessarily the case, though. The complex neutral frame is very abstract so that subjects may find it more difficult to understand the decision task than in the simple neutral frame. As context generally improves the understanding of decision tasks (see the evidence reported in Alekseev, Charness, & Gneezy, 2017), a comparison of the complex neutral frame to the health frames may not be a ceteris paribus exercise as two things might change at a time, frame and comprehension. This seems less problematic when considering the simple neutral frame. 13 Another, and even more fundamental, identification challenge was put forward by Harrison and List (2004) who argued that neutrally framed experiments run the risk that participants construct context in order to better understand the decision problem at hand. But then the frame might in fact not be neutral or, in other words, researchers lose control over the frame. As the simple neutral frame is easier to understand than the complex neutral frame, the construction of context is likely to be more prevalent in the latter frame. It is, thus, difficult to judge which of the two neutral frames is the more appropriate benchmark for the two health frames. This is why we present the results for all four frames.
Payoffs and incentives
The parameterization of the experiment was chosen such that prevention (vaccination or surgery) is the less risky alternative (see Table 1 ) and that the expected outcomes of the lotteries are identical for c = 30. Risk neutral individuals would, thus, strictly prefer the safer (riskier) alternative for c = 10 (c = 50). For c = 30, they would be indifferent between the two. In the descriptive statistics, we explain how this cost heterogeneity across decision rounds can be used to obtain revealed risk preferences. In addition, it allows us to construct an indicator of whether or not subjects behaved consistently (see Subsection 3.1 below).
Independent of whether an individual holds public or private health insurance, essential immunization, medically indicated surgeries, and sick pay are covered by all German health care plans. Therefore, the costs accruing in our settings are not monetary but in terms of time. To obtain vaccination, one needs to see a doctor coming with traveling and waiting time. This is similarly so when a tonsillectomy is chosen and hospital care is needed. In the event of an infection-no matter whether protected or not-healthy time is lost. To reflect this in our experiment, we formulated all costs in terms of time and let subjects use the remaining time to perform a real effort task.
Using the slider task of Gill and Prowse (2011) , subjects were asked to position as many sliders as possible at the middle position using the computer mouse. 14 At the end of each round, 48 nonaligned sliders appeared on the screen. Each correctly positioned slider was worth 50 Eurocents. To allow these reasonably high stakes, we had to randomly select one of the 15 rounds to determine the final payoff of a subject. The average payoff was 13.95 Euros translating into an hourly wage of 13.50 Euros, which is well above the German minimum wage of 8.50 Euros in 2015. 15 Participants were paid off in cash and in private.
The instructions of the experiment appeared on the computer screens, and subjects also received them in printed form (see Appendix). After subjects read the instructions, they had the chance to ask comprehension questions. Finally, we ran one practice round and, without time limits, let subjects position 12 sliders to the middle of the scale.
Questionnaire
At the end of each session (after the 15 rounds were finalized), subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire. Most importantly, subjects had to rate their general willingness to take risks on a 10-point Likert-scale, where 1 was associated with not at all willing to take risks and 10 with very willing to take risks. As was demonstrated by Dohmen et al. (2011) , this measure is a valid representation of risk preferences. 16 In the two health frames, we asked additional frame-specific questions. In the vaccination frame, we asked whether a subject had ever demanded (voluntary) vaccinations excluding childhood immunization and whether side effects had occurred in the past. We also asked whether thinking of an upcoming vaccination would frighten them and, more specifically, whether they are afraid of needles. In the surgery frame, we asked whether subjects ever had a surgery or any complications related to a surgery, whether thinking about an upcoming surgery would frighten them and, more specifically, whether they are afraid of anesthesia. 17
Hypotheses
In the two subsequent sections, we investigate the following hypotheses: First, we expect that more risk averse individuals are more likely to choose the safer alternative than less risk averse individuals. Second, we suspect that there are framing effects. More precisely, individual choice behavior may generally differ across frames and, in particular, there might be a differential impact of risk preferences on choice behavior. Vaccination behavior, for instance, might differ from behavior in structurally identical but alternatively framed settings. Finally, we suspected that the consistency of decision making depends on the frame. As argued above, consistency may be lower in the complex neutral frame than in the other three frames. We get following hypotheses (in their null form):
14 Sliders range from 0 to 100 so that the middle position is 50. The arrow keys on the keyboards were deactivated. 15 In 2015, the hourly wage for student assistants at the University of Augsburg was 8.50 Euros for Bachelor students and 10.50 Euros for Master students, respectively. 16 These authors also showed that risk preferences can differ across domains. But then our subjects' responses to the risk question may depend on the frame. We conducted pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to test for the equality of risk preference distributions and also ran pairwise Wilcoxon tests to test for the equality of the respective means. In none of the tests we were able to reject the null hypothesis so that we conclude that framing did not affect responses in the questionnaire or, in other words, it is innocent to administer the questionnaire at the end of the experiment. 17 All fear related measures use a 5-point scale ranging from not frightened at all (= 0) to very frightened (= 4).
Hypothesis 1. (Stated risk preferences and revealed risk preferences): Risk preferences as stated in the questionnaire are not associated with risk preferences as revealed through choice behavior.
Hypothesis 2. (Framing effects and stated risk preferences):
The impact of stated risk preferences on choice behavior is independent of the frame.
Hypothesis 3. (Framing effects and consistent behavior):
The consistency of choice behavior is independent of the frame.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
With 329 subjects and 15 decision rounds per subject we arrive at an analysis sample with 4935 data points. Before we turn to the econometric analysis in the next section we provide some descriptive results that already shed light on the relationship between stated risk preferences and risk-taking.
Stated and revealed risk preferences
The experiment was designed such that the expected income of the riskier alternative is identical to the expected income of the safer alternative when the deterministic cost of the safer alternative is 30 s. Risk averse individuals would, thus, certainly choose the safer alternative when the costs are 30 s or below. They might even choose the safer alternative for costs above 30 s, in our case, 50 s, provided they are sufficiently risk averse. Hence, for risk averters, we expect to find a share of safe choices between two thirds (the safer alternative is chosen when the costs are 10 or 30 s, that is, in 10 out of 15 rounds) and one (the safer alternative is chosen for all cost levels, that is, in 15 out of 15 rounds). Risk lovers would certainly choose the riskier alternative at costs of 30 s and above. They may still choose the riskier alternative for costs below 30 s, in our case, 10 s, when they are sufficiently attracted by gambling. With risk loving individuals, we would, thus, expect a share of choices for the safer alternative between zero and one third. For risk neutral individuals, a share between one third and two thirds is expected as they are indifferent between the two options when the costs for the safer alternative amount to 30 s. Individual choices are reflected in the indicator SAFE it that assumes the value one whenever individual i opted for the safer alternative in round t and zero otherwise. With around 60% decisions for the safer alternative, aggregate behavior is consistent with risk neutrality only (see Table 2 ). Comparing choices across frames, the respective percentages vary between 58 in the vaccination frame and 62 in the surgery frame so that the same picture emerges. 18 Figure 1 shows that the demand of the safer alternative is, as expected, decreasing in both the costs of the safer alternative and our stated risk preference measure. The latter result suggests that we are able to reject Hypothesis 1 (for a formal test, see Section 4).
When combining individual decision making with cost heterogeneity, we obtain a more precise picture. Consider first the low cost scenario, c = 10, where the expected outcome of the safer lottery is larger than the expected outcome of the riskier lottery. Now, suppose that an individual chooses the riskier alternative, then we can be sure that the individual is sufficiently risk loving as he/she prefers the riskier alternative over the safer one despite the lower expected returns. If an individual chooses the safer alternative, then the individual is either, risk averse, risk neutral, or modestly risk loving. This is exactly the other way round for the high cost scenario, c = 50. If an individual chooses the safer alternative despite its lower expected outcome, then the individual is sufficiently risk averse. If the riskier alternative is chosen, then the individual is either risk loving, risk neutral, or modestly risk averse.
To actually categorize individuals into risk types requires consistent behavior in the 15 decision rounds. Suppose an individual chooses the safer alternative at least once when the costs are 50 s. Then, we say that the individual is consistently risk averse if the safer alternative is always chosen when the costs are lower. If an individual chooses the riskier alternative in the low cost scenario at least once and always chooses the riskier alternative in the higher cost scenarios, then we say that the individual is consistently risk loving. To categorize individuals as risk neutral is impossible. We can, however, label individuals as almost risk neutral if their behavior is consistent with expected income maximization, that is, if the individual never chooses the safer alternative when the costs are high and always chooses the safer alternative when the costs are low. Using this definition, risk neutral individuals as well as modest risk averters and modest risk lovers are labeled consistently risk neutral. Note that these categories are well defined in the sense that they are disjoint, that is, each individual is assigned at most one risk preference. In our data, about 50% of individuals are not assigned to any of the three categories-their behavior is inconsistent. Twenty-two percent are consistently risk averse, 25% consistently (almost) risk neutral, and little more than 2% consistently risk loving. Although the categorization from above is perfectly reasonable, we lose a considerable amount of variation when not distinguishing, for instance, between consistent risk averters that choose the safer alternative at costs of 50 only once and those who always choose it. We would expect that individuals choose the safer alternative more often in the high cost scenario the more risk averse they are as this reduces the variation in the payoff of the experiment. This is particularly so as only one of the 15 rounds is randomly selected to determine the payoff. Constructing a revealed risk aversion variable by simply counting the number of times the safer alternative was chosen in the high cost scenario, we find, first, that all possible numbers from zero to five are actually assumed and, second, that there is a negative correlation of about −40% with our self-assessed risk attitude variable RISK i . Similarly, we construct a revealed risk lovers variable that also ranges from zero to five. The correlation with our risk attitude variable is about 9%. 19 Finally, subtracting the number of times an individual chose the riskier alternative when the costs were 10 from the number of times an individual chose the safer alternative when the costs were 50 gives a revealed preference measure, REVRISK i , ranging from −5 to 5. The correlation of this measure with stated risk preferences, RISK i , is −0.37 (when only considering consistent individuals, −0.35 when considering all individuals). 20 This variable lends itself an alternative to SAFE it as dependent variable in our econometric analysis (see the robustness analysis in Section 4.3). Figure C1 in the Appendix reveals that there are marked differences in the stated willingness to take risks between male and female subjects. In line with the more general literature on gender differences in risk preferences (see, e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009 and Eckel & Grossman, 2008) , we find that male subjects lean more towards a higher willingness to take risks than female subjects. This suggests that differences in decision making across gender may well be rooted in differences in risk preferences. Figure 2 shows indeed that the impact of risk attitudes on the probability of choosing the safer alternative differs between male and female subjects. For males, we find that the share of subjects choosing the safer alternative decreases from 100% in the lowest category to slightly above 40% in the highest category. For female subjects, the association between risk preferences and decision making is less pronounced but also negative.
Framing effects
We now turn to the question of whether or not decision making under risk is context specific. Independent of the cost of the safer alternative, there seems to be no systematic difference across frames, neither for male subjects nor for female subjects (see Figure 3 below ). It is difficult to detect differences in decision making across frames and the role of risk preferences therein using a descriptive analysis. We found above that risk preferences matter and that their role in decision making depends on gender. Additionally, risk preferences differ for male and female subjects. To assess framing effects (and to formally test Hypothesis 2), we have to factor in risk attitudes calling for an econometric analysis. 
FIGURE 3
Choice of the safer alternative, frames, gender, and costs
As far as consistent behavior is concerned, we find interesting discrepancies between male and female subjects and across frames. We mentioned above that about 50% of individuals behaved consistently according to our definition. While 64% of male subjects behaved consistently, only 33% of female subjects did so (Wilcoxon test p-value < .0001). There is also pronounced variation across frames. We suspected in Subsection 2.2.3 that subjects might find it difficult to understand the decision task in the complex neutral frame. Conducting Wilcoxon tests for all frame combinations, we find that the share of consistent choices is not statistically different in the two neutral frames (p-value = .2395). Alekseev et al. (2017) argued that context tends to assist individuals in understanding decision tasks. For the surgery frame, we can confirm this. As compared to the complex neutral frame, the share of consistently behaving subjects is significantly larger in the surgery frame (p-value = .0336) but not in the vaccination frame (p-value = .9971). Moreover, the share of consistent choices is significantly larger in the surgery frame than in the vaccination frame (p-value = .0299). Other than the surgery story, the vaccination story did not assist subjects to better understand the decision problem at hand. There are also some indications of interaction effects between gender and frame. While the difference between the complex neutral frame and the surgery frame is only significant for females (p-value = .0630), the difference between the two health frames is only marginally significant for both genders (male p-value = .0939, female p-value = .1114). 21 These results suggest that we can reject Hypothesis 3 and, indeed, a 2 -test considering gender and frame rejects the independence of consistency distributions (p-value < .0001).
Experience and fear
Differences in behavior across frames may be due to context specific experience and fears. In terms of experience, 45% of individuals report that they already had a surgery, whereas 61% of individuals already demanded immunization beyond standard childhood vaccinations. The indicator EXPERIENCE i captures this information. For vaccination related experience, there is a pronounced difference between male and female subjects: 72% of females have such experience and only 53% of males (Wilcoxon test p-value = .0746). The questionnaire contained three fear related measures. In the surgery frame, we asked for the occurrence of complications during past surgeries or thereafter, whether subjects are in general afraid of surgeries and whether they are afraid of anesthesia. While the first variable is an indicator, the latter two are coded from zero to four. Our fear indicator assumes the value one whenever the sum of these three measures is four or above. In the vaccination frame, we asked for the occurrence of vaccination related side effects in the past and whether subjects are afraid of vaccinations in general or afraid of needles in particular. The variables are coded on the same scales as in the surgery frame. The fear indicator assumes the value one whenever the sum of the three measures is two or above. The indicator FEAR i captures the information just described. Based on these definitions, we find that in both frames, 48% of subjects have context specific fears. 22 While vaccination related fears are statistically equally prevalent in both genders (45% for males and 51% for females), surgery related fears are significantly more prevalent in female subjects than in male subjects (68% and 30%, respectively; Wilcoxon test p-value = .0009). As we need to control for stated risk preferences when analyzing the relationship between choice behavior on the one side and health related fears and gender on the other side, we leave a more detailed analysis for Section 4.
Learning effects and randomization
The costs of the safer alternative remained constant for five consecutive periods and then changed to some other level. One might wonder whether there are any changes in behavior as the experiment proceeds. Using all observations, Figure 4 shows that there is no indication of learning effects. The same picture emerges when looking at the four frames in isolation. It is, thus, innocent to conduct the analysis on the full data set. In the econometric analysis, we nevertheless control for the repetition (the round within a five-period cost block) and for the cost profile (one of six permutations). We implemented the frames using a between subject design starting with the simple neutral frame, followed by the surgery frame, the vaccination frame, and the complex neutral frame. The validity of our study crucially depends on random assignment of the frames. To assess randomization, we constructed the variable "frame" that assumes the values 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the simple neutral, surgery, vaccination, and complex neutral frame, respectively. We then fitted a multinomial logit model using the risk attitude, age, and gender as explanatory variables and find that gender has explanatory power. Females are significantly more likely to be in the complex neutral frame. Reestimating the model without the complex neutral frame, none of the variables has explanatory power. In fact, the likelihood ratio test rejects the model as a whole (p-value = .82). While our first three frames are randomly assigned, the complex neutral frame is not. As participants may not only differ in observed factors but also in unobserved ones, for example, in the field of study, the results regarding the complex neutral frame should be interpreted cautiously. 23, 24 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
The descriptive analysis demonstrated substantial correlations between stated risk preferences (as measured by RISK i ) and risk-taking, that is, choice behavior of individuals (as measured by SAFE it ). The analysis also suggested gender differences in this relationship so that the interaction between stated risk preferences and gender is likely to be an important predictor for individual choice behavior. To test the impact of the decision environment on actual decisions, interaction terms between our risk measure and the frame are required. This is why we prefer linear probability models over alternative nonlinear models such as the probit or logit to assess the impact of risk attitudes on risk-taking. The main disadvantage of the nonlinear models is the difficulty in interpreting the coefficients of interaction terms: The nonlinearity implies that even without explicit interaction terms, both models include interactions by construction (see, e.g., Ai & Norton, 2003 and Greene, 2010) .
In the first step, we investigate the role of risk preferences and framing using the full data set followed by a genderstratified analysis. In the second step, we split the sample by gender and frame to investigate the potentially gender-specific impact of experience and fear on decision making under risk in alternate health environments. Finally, we conduct a robustness analysis using our revealed risk variable, REVRISK i , as dependent variable rather than individual choices as measured by SAFE it .
As several regressors do not vary over the 15 decision rounds, for example, the risk attitude and gender, clustering standard errors at the level of subjects is inevitable. Alternatively and equivalently, we can aggregate the 15 periods and use the share of decisions for the safer alternative, SAFE i , as dependent variable. This model yields the same conditional expectation and, consequently, the same coefficient estimates and the same standard errors.
Risk attitudes, gender, and frame
Our main regression results are shown in Table 3 below. All specifications include indicator variables for each repetition in a cost block of five consecutive rounds to account for learning effects as well as indicator variables for the respective cost profile to control for order effects. In addition to these indicators, Model 1 only includes the stated risk preference, RISK i , as explanatory variable. As suggested by standard economic theory, the more individuals are willing to take risks the lower the probability that they are choosing the safer alternative. A one point increase in the risk measure leads to a 4.8 percentage points drop in the demand for the safer alternative-a sizable and highly statistically significant effect. Notably, this effect is robust across Models 1 through 4. We can reject Hypothesis 1: There is a significant association between stated risk preferences and risk-taking in our experiment. This result is in line with the descriptive analysis (see Figures 1 and 2 above) .
Model 2 reveals that, in the pooled model, there is no direct effect of the decision environment on choice behavior. With a joint p-value of .6179, the three indicators for the complex neutral frame and the two health frames are far from reaching statistical significance (the simple neutral frame serves as reference category). To further investigate the potential role of the decision environment, we interact our risk measure with the framing indicators (Model 3). Neither the frames nor their interactions with our risk measure have any explanatory power. Finally, we add cost indicators, age, and gender and still find no significant impact of the frame (Model 4). The cost indicators are highly statistically significant and have the expected signs. With a cost of 30 s as reference category, we find a 22.4 percentage points increase in the probability of choosing the safer alternative when the cost is 10 s. With a cost of 50 s, there is a 31.4 percentage points drop in the probability of choosing the safer alternative. Although age does not affect decision making, we find that male subjects have a 6.8 percentage points higher probability of choosing the safer alternative. Although male subjects are more willingly to take risks, they lean-for a given risk attitude-more towards the safer alternative.
The descriptive analysis revealed some marked differences in decisions under risk across gender so that the pooled analysis may be misleading. Indeed, stratification by gender shows that the impact of risk preferences and framing strongly depends on gender. The Wald-tests show that there are no direct framing effects for male subjects (p-value = .3208) and that the impact of risk preferences on decision making does not systematically differ across frames (p-value = .2147). For males, we are unable to reject Hypothesis 2. Although statistically insignificant, an interesting picture emerges: The demand for the safer alternative is 17 to 19 percentage points smaller in the more complex frames than in the simple neutral frame and the role of risk preferences is reduced to about −4 to −3 percentage points. 25 The picture is different for female subjects. We find significant direct framing effects (p-value = .0132) and a significantly different impact of risk preferences on choice behavior across frames (p-value = .0490). The significance of framing effects is driven by the surgery frame. As compared to the simple neutral frame, the demand for the safer alternative is 37.2 percentage points larger in the surgery frame-a huge effect. Part of this difference is likely due to differences in the complexity between these two frames. A direct comparison of the surgery frame to the complex neutral frame and the vaccination frame, however, shows a significant increase of 20.3 percentage points for the former (p-value = .0720) and 24.3 percentage points for the latter (p-value = .0446). The importance of risk preferences also differs across frames. In the surgery frame, a one-point increase in the risk measure reduces the demand for the safer alternative by 9.1 percentage points (≈ −0.0252 − 0.0658). This effect significantly differs from the effects in the two neutral frames, a 2.5 percentage points reduction in the simple neutral frame (p-value = .0074) and a 5.2 percentage points reduction in the complex neutral frame (≈ −0.0252 − 0.0268, p-value = .0725). There is no significant difference in the two health frames, though (p-value = .2920). There seems to be nothing special about vaccination; it is the surgery environment that is different. In any event, for females, we can reject Hypothesis 2.
One can certainly speculate why framing effects obtain for females but not for males. The descriptive analysis revealed that the share of consistent choices is the largest in the surgery frame for both male and female subjects. The difference was particularly large for females when comparing the complex neutral frame and the surgery frame. The significant difference in the direct impact of the complex neutral frame and the surgery frame might be rooted in this phenomenon. This might also apply to the differential impact of risk preferences on choice behavior between these two frames. Using the stratified models, we calculated the predicted probabilities for the different frames. The point estimates including their 95% confidence intervals as well as the conditional means are shown in Figure 5 for males and Figure 6 for females below. These illustrations of our regression results show nicely that, for male subjects, the association between stated risk preferences and choice behavior is stronger in the simple neutral frame than in the three more complex frames. For females, we observe the exact opposite. The complexity of the decision problem, thus, seems to matter.
Health related experience and fears
To investigate health related experience and fears, we split the sample by frame. In the first step, we fit the full model from the previous subsection, that is, Model 4. The regression results are shown in Table 4 below. The coefficients of stated risk preferences can directly be compared to the ones obtained in the pooled analysis (see Table 3 above), and we find that the association between stated risk preferences and choice behavior is remarkably robust.
In the second step, we add our measures for health related experience and fears. Although experience plays no role in the surgery frame, it matters in the vaccination frame. The reason might be that experimental subjects did not perceive the tonsillectomy in the surgery frame as something elective but rather as a medically indicated procedure. By contrast, whether or not to vaccinate is typically a repeated individual decision (this is most evident when considering the flu shot that should ideally be demanded once a year). We find that the experience effect of about 11.2 percentage points in the pooled model is largely driven by female subjects. Although experience plays no significant role for male subjects, the probability of demanding immunization is 19.8 percentage points larger for female subjects when vaccination is a "habit" as compared to when it is not. The fact that surgeries may be inevitable may also explain the insignificance of health related fears in the surgery frame. Given that the public debate on vaccinations tends to be irrational in places, one would expect a negative impact of vaccination related fears on immunization decisions. Rather surprisingly, we find a significantly positive effect. Once again, the relatively large share of inconsistent females in the vaccination frame may explain this result. 26 It might also be that the fear measure does not appropriately capture vaccination related fears. It should be noted, though, that the significance of the fear measure disappears when we choose alternative definitions of it. 27
Robustness analysis
In the regressions discussed so far, the dependent variable was SAFE it , that is, we used all 15 decisions per individual to investigate the role of stated risk preferences and the decision environment on choice behavior. Using the 15 decisions per individual and relating them to the costs of the safer alternative, we constructed the revealed preference variable REVRISK i . The regression results with REVRISK i as dependent variable are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. Note that the dependent variable does not vary over the 15 rounds so that we are conducting an aggregate analysis. 28 With minor changes in significance, our results qualitatively mirror those of Subsection 4.1. The association between stated risk preferences and revealed risk preferences is significantly negative across all specifications, that is, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. In the pooled model, there are neither direct framing effects nor any relevant interactions of frames and stated risk preferences. The picture changes when separately analyzing male and female subjects. For male subjects, the direct effect of the frame is only marginally significant. As before, decisions in the three complex frames do not systematically differ so that there is, at most, a complexity effect. Regarding the impact of risk preferences, we find that their impact tends to be larger in the simple neutral frame as compared to the three more complex frames. The latter effect is, again, exactly the opposite for female subjects where risk preferences matter most in the more complex environments. We can reject Hypothesis 2. The results regarding the surgery frame for females are less pronounced than in our main specification.
CONCLUSION
Immunization decisions involve a tradeoff between two risky alternatives suggesting an association between risk preferences and the demand for vaccinations. The empirical literature on this association is slim (see Tsutsui et al., 2010, Tsutsui 26 When distinguishing between the fear effect of inconsistent females and the fear effect of consistent females, significance disappears. 27 Remember, we let the fear indicator assume the value one, whenever the sum of three fear related measures is two or above. If we had used the same definition as for the fear indicator in the surgery frame, namely a threshold of four, then the coefficient would be substantially smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero. 28 We implemented it by clustering standard errors. Note that aggregation implies that we cannot assess the impact of the costs of the safer alternative on choice behavior as average costs are always 30 s. Also, repetition dummies cannot and need not be included as control variables. Nuscheler & Roeder, 2016) and offers no clear-cut results. This may well be due to an important shortcoming of this literature, the lack of control over individual risk. We addressed this methodological weakness by designing a controlled laboratory experiment. In order to control risk exposure, we considered an exogenously given infection rate. This is in contrast to recent laboratory experiments on vaccination decisions that all highlight the importance of the positive vaccination externality (see Chapman et al., 2012 , Ibuka et al., 2014 , Böhm et al., 2016 , and Böhm et al., 2017 but neglect the role of risk preferences. As evidence suggests that risk preferences may be domain and gender specific (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011 , for the former and Croson & Gneezy, 2009 , for the latter), we implemented four different frames, namely, vaccination, surgery, complex neutral, and simple neutral and conducted a gender stratified analysis. We found that the association between risk preferences and risk-taking depends on gender and frame. For male subjects, there is a significantly negative association in the simple neutral frame. For the three more complex frames, there is no such association. The picture is distinctly different for female subjects where the role of risk preferences is more pronounced in the complex frames. We found direct framing effects for females but not males. For the former, the demand for the safer alternative is significantly larger in the surgery frame than in all other frames. In addition to the nontrivial interaction between gender, risk preferences, frame, and choice behavior, we also investigated how the share of consistently deciding subjects varies across frames and gender. We found particularly strong framing effects for female subjects. The share of consistently behaving females was smallest in the complex neutral frame. Alekseev et al. (2017) argued that context improves decision making. This is indeed the case when providing female subjects with surgery context but not when providing them with vaccination context. There is, thus, something special about vaccinations in the sense that it prevents females from better understanding the decision task. There are no such effects for male subjects who generally decided more consistently than female subjects.
Our results carry important messages for laboratory health economics experiments: Health interpretations of neutrally framed experiments may be problematic. Any bias associated with such interpretations may depend on gender and on the health context under consideration. To draw policy conclusions from our experiment is less straightforward. The results suggest that individuals tend to find it more difficult to understand the relevant tradeoffs in the vaccination frame than in the surgery frame. This is surprising as the instructions were very transparent and-except for the story-identical in the two health frames. If anything, health policy makers may wish to better explain the nature of vaccination decisions in the hope to improve the consistency of individual decision making. Whether or not this helps to improve immunization rates remains an open question.
A potential shortcoming of our analysis is the failure to randomly assign subjects to the four frames. The frame of concern is the complex neutral frame where the share of female subjects was markedly higher than in the other three frames. As we control for gender, a bias only obtains when gender is correlated with unobserved factors that are associated with both risk preferences as stated in the questionnaire and risk-taking in the laboratory. Due to self-selection into academic disciplines, the field of study might be such an unobserved factor.
Finally, it should be noted that we investigated the role of risk attitudes in alternate frames considering relatively large probabilities that are well in line with influenza and the flu shot. Our analysis is, thus, unlikely to suffer from the systematic overestimation of small probabilities (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979) . It may well be that such an overestimation is frame specific. This would be the case, for instance, if the probability of side effects in the vaccination frame is perceived as being larger than the probability of complications in the surgery frame despite objectively identical probabilities. We leave this analysis for future research.
How to cite this article: Binder S, Nuscheler R. Risk-taking in vaccination, surgery, and gambling environments: Evidence from a framed laboratory experiment. 
A.1 Course of the experiment
The experiment composes of 15 decision rounds.
At the beginning of each round, you have to decide whether or not to vaccinate against a disease. The respective disease cannot be transmitted from one human being to another. The virus causing the disease only affects the well-being of humans. You are exposed to the virus with a probability of 40%.
At the beginning of each round, your time budget is 140 time units (TU). Depending on your vaccination decision, your time budget may drop. At the end of each round the remaining time can be used to perform a task. The task is to position as many sliders as possible at the middle position (see A.3 below). Your payoff depends on the number of sliders you were able to position at the middle position (see A.4 below).
A.2 Description of the vaccine and the disease A.2.1 Situation without vaccination
Should you decide to go without immunization, you are infected with certainty when you are exposed to the virus. In that case, you lose 100 TU so that 40 TU are left remaining for the task. In case you are not exposed to the virus, you remain healthy. Your time budget remains unchanged so that you are left with 140 TU for the task.
A.2.2 Situation with vaccination
Vaccination is costly. If you vaccinate, then your time endowment is reduced by c TU, where c can be 10, 30, or 50. Each value applies for five consecutive rounds. The order of the different cost levels is randomly chosen. At the beginning of each round, you are informed about the costs.
Vaccination does not offer perfect protection against the disease. If you are exposed to the virus, the vaccine prevents infection in 50% of the cases. In this case, you remain healthy and you are left with 140-c TU for the task. In the remaining cases, the vaccine is not effective so that you get infected should you be exposed to the virus. The disease is less severe than without vaccination so that the loss amounts to 25 TU.
Independent of the efficacy of the vaccine, there is a 20% probability of side effects. In the event of side effects, your time budget is reduced by 25 TU.
The table on the next page summarizes the situations described above and also provides you with the probabilities and time budgets for each outcome. (Remark: 
A.3 The task
Suppose that at the end of a round your time budget is 140 TU. In this case, you have 140 s to position the sliders to the middle position. There are 48 sliders in each round.
A.4 Payoff
For each correctly positioned slider, you receive 1 Taler. At the end of the experiment, one of the 15 rounds is randomly chosen and you receive the number of Taler you earned in the respective round. Taler are converted to Euro using the exchange rate 1 Taler = 50 Eurocent. For participating in the experiment, you receive an additional 4 Euro as show-up fee. 
